This paper presents a model in which safe assets are systemic because they are the medium of exchange for risky assets. Like commodity money, these assets are costly to produce and have some intrinsic value, resulting in (a) non-neutrality and (b) overproduction. Quantitatively, the welfare consequences of these inefficiencies depend on the costs of producing safe assets, which can be inferred from the equilibrium value of the liquidity premium. When the model is calibrated to plausible liquidity premia the resulting inefficiencies are not large.
Introduction
In the study of the recent financial crisis, many analogies have been drawn between safe assets and money. A common view of the 2007-09 crisis is that it was prompted by a contraction in the effective supply of money-like assets, as various securities that were previously perceived as very safe and liquid were instead perceived as risky, consequently becoming illiquid (Gorton and Metrick (2012) ).
The goal of this paper is to formalize the analogy between safe assets and money. In particular, we argue that, since the production of safe assets requires real resources and since safe assets carry coupon payments that are valued regardless of their use as a medium of exchange, the appropriate conceptual framework for understanding their properties is as commodity rather than fiat money. Our model suggests two main implications: (a) changes in the quantity of safe assets can have real effects on the quantity of trading (even absent nominal rigidities), and (b) there is overproduction of safe assets.
These inefficiencies associated with commodity money are often cited as grounds for the superiority of a fiat currency (Barro (1979) ; Ritter (1995) , and Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) ). In line with this criticism, our model implies that the use of safe assets as a medium of exchange in financial trading is inefficient. However, a quantitative interpretation of the model suggests that these inefficiencies are not large. In particular, we show that these inefficiencies are increasing in the costs of creating safe assets, which can be inferred from the liquidity premium. Given plausible estimates of the liquidity premium, our simulations suggest that large fluctuations in the quantity of safe assets are associated with only minor changes in welfare, and that there are only minuscule inefficiencies generated by the overproduction of safe assets.
A corollary of this analysis is that the contraction in the stock of safe assets during the 2007-09 crisis is unlikely to be the direct cause of its sub-sequent severity, at least not through the channels emphasized here. The quantitative interpretation of our model suggests that the contraction in the stock of safe assets was largely offset by an increase in the liquidity premium, rather than by a contraction in the quantity of trading. In fact, while the spike in liquidity premiums during the crisis was viewed by many as cause for alarm, our model suggests that this equilibrium adjustment had an important mitigating effect.
While there has been broad agreement in the literature that the analogy between safe assets and money is potentially useful, there has been some disagreement regarding the extent to which safe assets should be thought of as "nominal balances" or as "real balances" (M and M respectively in stanp dard notation). For example, Stein (2012) and Krishnamurthy and VissingJorgensen (2012) consider money-in-the-utility-function models in which safe assets enter the utility function directly, analogously to M . In contrast, Rop cheteau and Wright (2013), Midrigan and Philippon (2011), Hart and Zingales (2015) and Hart and Zingales (2011) consider models in which safe assets are the medium of exchange, analogously to nominal balances. Our paper clarifies the relationship between these two approaches. This paper contributes to an emerging literature on the systemic importance of safe assets, including Caballero (2006) , Caballero et al. (2008) , Gourinchas and Jeanne (2012) , Ordonez (2013), and Dang et al. (2012) (among others). Similar to Rocheteau and Wright (2013) , Shen and Yan (2014) , Hart and Zingales (2011) and Hart and Zingales (2015) , this paper contributes to the discussion by studying the money-like properties of safe assets. Most closely related are Hart and Zingales (2011) and Hart and Zingales (2015) . These papers highlight that when safe assets have a transaction role, there is an oversupply of safe assets relative to the social optimum. In this paper, we apply this insight to an environment in which safe assets are used for facilitating trading in risky assets. This paper is related to an extensive literature that studies pecuniary ex-ternalities in constrained environments, such as Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) , Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) , Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), Lorenzoni (2008) , Bianchi (2011 ), Farhi et al. (2009 ), Bengui (2013 , Korinek (2011) and Eden (ming) (among others). It is a well-established principle that in the presence of binding constraints, a decentralized equilibrium may be inefficient due to inefficient price impacts on constrained agents. This paper relates this principle to the inefficiency of private money creation in an environment in which the cash-in-advance constraint is binding, and draws implications regarding excessive private creation of safe assets. Our modeling approach is motivated by important insights from the New Monetarist view of liquidity (see Lagos et al. (2015) for a review). As illustrated by Lagos (2011) , there is a theoretical equivalence between collateral assets and assets used as a medium of exchange. In our model, we assume that safe assets are used directly as a medium of exchange, building on this equivalence for the broader interpretation of the model. While our approach resembles a New Monetarist approach in some ways, there are also some differences. In particular, our model departs from the assumption of bilateral trading and assumes the presence of trading posts in which risky assets are exchanged for the safe asset. This precludes the possibility that traders meet by chance and choose to exchange one risky asset for another.
1 We emphasize that the aim of our paper is to apply and quantify insights from monetary theory to the liquidity properties of safe assets, rather than to contribute to the deep understanding of the foundations of the medium of exchange. For this purpose, we adopt a framework that abstracts from multiple equilibria and imposes the use of safe assets as a medium of exchange in risky assets.
Stylized facts
Before discussing the model, it is useful to illustrate some empirical regularities that form the basis for the analogy between safe assets and money, particularly around the crisis. This section cites some suggestive evidence that safe assets provide liquidity services to the financial system, and that the contraction in safe assets was associated with an increase in liquidity premiums and a decline in trading volumes of illiquid assets. Pozsar (2013) documents the critical role of safe assets like Treasury bills (t-bills), commercial paper (CP), repurchase agreements (repos), and others in institutional cash pools that are not fully counted in traditional money supply aggregates like M2. Because of limits on Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insurance, holders of large quantities of cash cannot rely on transaction accounts to store their liquid and transaction funds without credit risk. Under their broader measure of money, classical M2 represents only about half of the total. However, among institutional and securities lender cash pools, non-M2 assets are about 80 percent of cash and cash equivalents. While short term government debt is a significant source of these non-depository safe assets, private actors, notably in shadow banking, meet additional demand for safe assets through securitization and collateral intermediation (Claessens et al. (2012) ). During the financial crisis a significant fraction of these privately manufactured liquid safe assets ceased to be safe liquid assets (Gorton and Metrick (2012) ) leading to significant increase in the price of liquidity. Figure 1 shows percentage of yield given up by on-the-run U.S. Treasury holders over holding similar duration off-the-run securities. Since off-the-run U.S. Treasuries are already more liquid than many assets, this premium observed during the crisis is substantial given the actual liquidity difference. When considering less liquid assets, the effect is even more pronounced. Figure 2 shows the price series of government insured Sallie-Mae student loan pool backed bonds around the financial crisis. These bonds have a credit and interest rate risk very similar to U.S. Treasuries but are much less liquid. During the crisis these securities traded at about an 8 percent discount to par and figure 2 documents that the remaining risks do not explain this discount, suggesting illiquidity is the primary reason for depressed prices. Given these pronounced premia over otherwise identical less-liquid safe assets, liquid safe assets were in short supply in the financial crisis.
In addition to these large increases in liquidity premia in assets with no credit risk, some markets for assets with credit risk froze up entirely in the crisis. Hemmerdinger (2012) documents that auction-rate and shortput bond origination declined precipitously as a result of the crisis. Radde (2015) and Covitz et al. (2013) discuss the trading breakdown in repo, interbank lending, and asset-backed commercial paper markets. Given the timing coincident to so much asset market disorder, it is natural to wonder if safe assets have an important role in facilitating the efficient trading of illiquid assets and if the welfare losses from this illiquidity are large.
Model
This section presents a model in which safe assets are used as a medium of exchange in risky assets. The model features traders with different preferences towards an evolving state of nature. Safe assets are valued similarly by all agents. Though we will interpret the objects in our model as safe and risky assets, it is worth emphasizing that the model also provides a general treatment of economies in which an asset with real returns is used as the medium of exchange.
Time is discrete and indexed t = 0, 1, .... There are n > 2 states of nature indexed ω = 1, ..., n. States of nature occur with equal probabilities, and are drawn independently across time.
There are n+1 assets, consisting of n risky assets indexed j = 1, .., n, and one safe asset. The safe asset delivers 1 unit of the final good each period, 6 regardless of the state. The risky asset indexed j delivers one unit of the final good in state ω = j, and nothing otherwise.
2 The aggregate supplies of the risky assets are denoted {A j } n j=1 , and the aggregate supply of the safe asset is denoted A s . Markets are incomplete in that all assets must be held in weakly positive quantities.
There is a unit measure of traders of each type. Types are indexed i = 1, .., n, corresponding to the states of nature. A trader of type i values consumption in state i more than in other states. Types are stochastic and negatively correlated across time: a trader of type i at time t draws his t + 1 type from {1, .., n} \ {i}, where each type occurs with equal probability. The changes in types across time create a motive for trade in assets. The trader's preferences are described by:
where c t is time t consumption, u(·) is an increasing and concave function satisfying the Inada conditions, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, θ > 0 is a preference parameter and χ ωt=it is an indicator function that takes a value 1 if ω t = i t , and 0 otherwise. 3 Traders are informed of their types one period in advance: information on i t+1 arrives at time t. Based on this information, the traders may want to rebalance their asset portfolios. A trader's "favorite" risky asset corresponds to the asset a j such that i t+1 = j; all other risky assets will be referred to as "nonfavorite". We assume that risky assets are less liquid than safe assets, in the sense that the markets for directly trading one risky asset for another are too thin and do not open. Instead, trading takes place in n markets in which risky assets are traded for the safe asset. Starr (2008) shows these moneygood bilateral markets can lead to the exclusion of good-good markets if bilateral markets are costly to open. Hart and Zingales (2015) offer some microfoundations for the emergence of safe assets as the medium of exchange.
Traders may enter each market only once during the trading period (either as buyers or sellers). The safe asset therefore has a money-like quality, in that it is assumed necessary for trading purposes. The trader allocates a fraction γ j of his safe assets for the purpose of buying risky assets of type j. The price of risky assets of type j (in terms of safe assets) is denoted p j . It is assumed for simplicity that dividends cannot be used for trading.
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Denote the trader's holdings of assets of type j by a j , and his holdings of safe assets by a s . We assume that, in addition to dividends, each agent receives a constant endowment of size e. In recursive form, the trader's problem can be written as follows:
The trader's value function, V (·), is a function of 2n + 5 state variables: the initial holdings of each of the n risky assets ({a j } n j=1 ), their respective market prices ({p j }), the initial holding of the safe asset (a s ), the state of nature (ω), the agent's endowment (e), the agent's type, i, and the agent's type next period, i . The trader consumes dividends and his endowment, and re-optimizes his portfolio by choosing {a j } n j=1 and a s . During the trading period, the trader can choose to allocate a fraction γ j of his safe assets for the purpose of buying the risky asset of type j. Equation 6 states that the market value of assets of type j purchased by the trader must be less than or equal to the amount of safe assets that he allocates for buying in market j.
Equation 7 states that traders cannot hold negative amounts of assets. Finally, equation 8 describes the evolution of the agent's safe asset holding: the left side is the net increase in safe assets, and the right hand side is net the value of sales of risky assets.
Note that, in this framework, safe assets are valued independently from their use as a medium of exchange: in addition to the liquidity services that they provide (equation 6), they deliver returns in the form of dividends (equation 3). The dividends associated with safe assets correspond, in a standard monetary framework, to interest payments on money. In a model of commodity money, these returns correspond to the consumption value of the commodity (e.g., the utility from looking at shiny gold).
Welfare and efficiency. As a benchmark, it is useful to consider the efficient allocation, defined as the solution to the following problem:
s.t.
In other words, the efficient allocation is achieved by a planner who assigns equal Pareto weights to all agents and can allocate assets to traders depending on their type. The efficient allocation allocates more consumption to agents with i = ω. Specifically, it equalizes the marginal utility of consumption across agents:
where c * is the allocation of consumption to agents with i = ω and c * is the allocation of consumption to agents with i = ω. For simplicity, we restrict attention to the case in which the above allocation cannot be achieved without all agents holding positive amounts of each risky asset. Formally we assume that:
The left hand side is the supply of safe assets, together with the endowment. In a symmetric equilibrium, this will correspond to the non-state-contingent dividends of all agents. If agents do not hold a positive amount of their nonfavorite risky assets, this will be their consumption in their nonfavorite state. The inequality states that in order to implement the efficient allocation all agents must hold positive quantities of all risky assets.
For the purpose of welfare analysis, social welfare is given by equation 9.
Equilibrium. To define an equilibrium, index the set of traders by x ∈ X, and let the set of trader x's state variables be given by:
A recursive equilibrium of this economy is given by policy functions a x,j (S x ), a x,s (S x ) , γ j (S x ) and prices p j ({S x } x∈X ) that jointly solve the trader's optimization problem and the market clearing conditions:
The market clearing conditions state that the demand for each asset must equal the supply of each asset; since there is no change in the aggregate supply of assets, the aggregate changes in asset positions must be equal to 0. Of course, by symmetry, there is an equilibrium in which p j = p i for all i and j. We will focus on that symmetric equilibrium and sometimes omit the subscript j (p = p j ). Further, we will focus on a steady state equilibrium, in which prices are constant across time (p = p ).
In a symmetric steady state, consumption depends on whether or not the trader's favorite state of nature has been realized. Denote equilibrium consumption when i = ω by c and equilibrium consumption when i = ω by c.
The following proposition characterizes the symmetric steady state equilibrium as a function of safe asset supply. For simplicity, we hold the efficient allocation constant by assuming that E = e + A s is constant (thus, a change in A s does not change the aggregate amount of goods in each state 5 ):
Proposition 1 Assume that e + A s = E. Holding E constant:
1. For A s sufficiently large, the steady state implements the efficient allo-cation, and prices are given by p j = 1 . n 2. Otherwise, the efficient allocation is not implemented, and welfare is increasing in A s . Buyers are constrained: (1 + θ)u (c) > u (c). Safe assets are associated with a liquidity premium, reflected in the fact that p < 1 . Further, p and (u j j
The proof is in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 establishes that when safe assets are scarce, increasing the supply of safe assets increases trading volume and therefore equilibrium welfare. The next section establishes that despite these benefits, there may be excessive resources spent on the private creation of safe assets.
As an aside, it is worth emphasizing that when safe assets are sufficiently abundant, the equilibrium implements the efficient allocation. Thus, this model illustrates a potential advantage of commodity money (or safe assets) over fiat money. While the literature suggests that the implementation of the Friedman rule (Friedman (1969) ) may not be feasible in an economy in which fiat money is used as a medium of exchange (see ?, Wilson (1979) , Cole and Kocherlakota (1998) and Ireland (2003)), our model illustrates that it is possible to satiate agents with liquidity given a form of commodity money that is sufficiently abundant. Safe assets that pay dividends can be used in the place of interest-bearing money to satiate the economy with liquidity, effectively implementing the Friedman rule.
Creation of safe assets
This section extends the model to study the welfare implications of costly private creation of safe assets. Consider a simple framework in which each trader has a costly technology that transforms his endowment stream {e} ∞ t=0 into additional safe assets. For simplicity, assume that at t = −1 (before trading begins), each agent can sacrifice a fraction γ of his endowment stream to create γ safe assets (where , γ ≤ 1). The trader's problem at t = −1 can be written as:
We assume an interior solution in which traders transform part of their illiquid endowment into safe assets (γ ∈ (0, 1) ). The trader's first order condition with respect to safe asset creation is:
To characterize the solution to the above equation, it is useful to distinguish between two cases. When = 1, it is costless to transform e into a s ; thus, in equilibrium, the marginal benefit of a s is the same as the marginal benefit of e. In other words, there is no liquidity premium. In this case, by proposition 1, the efficient allocation is implemented and the economy is satiated with liquidity. If, instead, < 1, then the above equation can have a solution only when there is a liquidity premium, e.g. only when safe assets are scarce.
6 Absent a positive liquidity premium, the trader would be indifferent between safe assets and e, and since < 1, the trader would optimally set γ = 0. An interior solution therefore implies a positive liquidity premium. The above condition further illustrates how the cost of creating liquid safe assets, , can be inferred from the liquidity premium. Intuitively, the marginal benefit of liquid safe assets ( ∂V ) is equal to the marginal return to ∂as safe assets ( ∂V ), plus the liquidity benefits which are valued at the liquidity ∂e premium. In the quantitative interpretation of the model in the next section, we will utilize the above relation to calibrate .
To evaluate the efficiency of the decentralized solution, consider next the problem of a social planner that can dictate to traders how many safe assets to create. The planner's t = −1 problem can be written as:
s.t. p j = p(A s ), where p(·) is a function mapping the aggregate supply of safe assets to equilibrium prices (p). The difference between the planner's problem and the trader's (decentralized) problem is that the planner internalizes that an increase in the supply of safe assets may lead to a decline in the liquidity premium (see Proposition 1). The planner's first order condition is:
Note that the social return to safe assets ( ∂V ) is weakly lower than the ∂As private return to safe assets ( ∂V ). When there are sufficient safe assets, ∂as there is no liquidity premium associated with safe assets and the relative price of risky and safe assets simply reflects the difference in expected asset returns. In this case, ∂p = 0 and ∂V = ∂V .
∂As ∂As ∂as
Otherwise, buyers of risky assets are constrained and ∂V < 0. It therefore ∂p follows that ∂V < ∂V , and there is excessive private creation of safe assets ∂As ∂as relative to the social optimum. This result is a consequence of a pecuniary externality: when traders create safe assets, they do not internalize that an increase in the supply of safe assets reduces the liquidity premium (raises p). As buyers are constrained in each market, the increase in p worsens equilibrium welfare. It is useful to emphasize that there is no distortion when = 1. In this case, the supply of safe assets is such that there is no liquidity premium, and the economy is satiated with safe assets. In this case, ∂p = 0 and the ∂As planner's solution coincides with the decentralized equilibrium allocation.
This benchmark suggests that when → 1, the inefficiency due to excessive private creation of safe assets approaches 0. In the following section, we will argue that this is the empirically relevant case.
Quantitative interpretation
This section proposes a quantitative interpretation of the model, with two goals in mind. The first is to quantify the degree of non-neutrality of safe assets, or the real effects resulting from a large contraction in the stock of safe assets. The second is to quantify the inefficiency due to excessive private creation of safe assets. The baseline model in Section 2 has five parameters: n, θ, A r , A s and e. To calibrate the model, we normalize A r = 1 and fix the number of states (n) between 2 and 200,000. As it turns out, our results are not very sensitive to the choice of n. Given A r and n, we calibrate the remaining parameters θ, A s and e to match the following targets:
1. We match stock market trading volume or the "velocity" of safe assets.
In the model, assuming that A s is below the saturation threshold level, A s trades hands in every trading round, in purchasing p(c − c). Note that A s is the quantity of safe assets, not their value. The net present value of safe assets is
. We then define the trading β volume as a fraction of GDP as:
We target a pre-crisis tv s = 3.0 in line with Singh (2011).
2.

1
The relative liquidity premium is defined as n − 1. To see this, note p that when the liquidity premium is 0, p = 1 . If p is lower than 1 , n n it is valued at a positive premium. We target a liquidity premium of 2 percent, in the range of values that Elmer (1999) estimates as the value created by loan securitization as a percent of the original balance.
7 Alternatively, we could take as a liquidity premium the costs of creating an Agency Mortgage-Backed-Securities (MBS). We estimate these costs by adding the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac guarantee fees (Federal Housing Finance Agency (2014) ) to the yield improvement estimates of Sanders (2005) which amount to 0.5 percent of principal. We choose the larger of the two estimates to give the liquidity channel a greater chance to have an effect.
3. The share of safe assets out of total assets ( e+As ) is targeted at
to match Gorton et al. (2010) .
Using the equilibrium relationship in equation 14, we can then calibrate as = ∂V / ∂V .
∂e ∂as
The equilibrium is characterized by three endogenous variables: p, c and c. To solve for the equilibrium, we therefore rely on three equilibrium conditions. The first is the goods market clearing condition: c+(n−1)c = n(A r +A s +e). The second is an equilibrium condition stating that constrained traders spend all of their safe assets on purchasing their favorite risky asset. The third condition is obtained from the indifference of traders with respect to selling their nonfavorite risky assets (equation 23 in the Appendix A). Appendix B provides the details of the equations used for the simulation.
As a first exercise, we consider the implications of a 30 percent decline in liquid safe assets, which is roughly in line with the share of asset backed securities and mortgage backed securities in safe assets in Gorton et al. (2010) . To put the welfare consequences of a liquidity crisis in perspective we also calculate a version of the model under autarchy (no-trade, constant symmetric portfolios). Figure 4 shows the basic result: both in absolute terms and relative to the gains from trade, the losses from the liquidity crisis are small (regardless 7 He estimates a range of 1.60-3.00 percent.
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of the choice of n). For an n = 2 the welfare losses of the liquidity crisis are 14 percent of the gains over autarchy but as n increases they rapidly become a de minimis fraction of the gains from trade.
We next consider the welfare loses from the overproduction of safe sassets. Figure 4 shows that the losses are quantitatively small relative to autarchy and the liquidity crisis. Normalizing the welfare losses by the liquidity crisis losses indicates they are between 0.3 to 1.4 percent of crisis losses.
This quantitative interpretation highlights two striking features. First, safe assets are approximately a neutral medium of exchange. Large changes in the stock of safe assets lead to only minor changes in equilibrium allocations. This is similar to fiat money in an environment in which money is neutral. Second, while there is overproduction of safe assets, the inefficiency is not large since the cost of producing safe assets is small. This too is similar to fiat money, which is costless to produce. Furthermore, the low cost of production results in an equilibrium allocation in which the economy is nearly satiated with liquidity, similar to a monetary economy in which the Friedman rule is implemented.
Conclusion
This paper makes several steps towards understanding the properties of safe assets as a medium of exchange in financial trading. We show that while, conceptually, the appropriate way to think about safe assets is as a form of commodity money, in practical terms, they are quantitatively indistinguishable from fiat money in a model in which money is neutral. In particular, we illustrate numerically that large changes in the quantity of safe assets result in only small changes in equilibrium allocations and that, given empirically relevant measures of the liquidity premium, safe assets appear to be nearly costless to produce.
In fact, our analysis suggests that -perhaps unlike traditional forms of commodity money -a monetary system that relies on safe assets as a medium of exchange is relatively efficient. The fact that safe assets are valued independently from their use as a medium of exchange means that, when sufficiently abundant, the economy can be satiated with liquidity. 
Together with the market clearing condition and A s = p(c − c) we have three equations in three unknowns (p, c and c). Because the calibration of turnover and velocity are to flows measured in years we choose β = 0.97 corresponding to an annual discount rate. For each n we choose a θ and fraction of all safe assets (Y saf e ≡ A s + e) that are liquid (
As ≡ s to satisfy
Y saf e the pre-crisis calibration requirements. The calibration is simplified because s does not depend on n or θ.
(40) (2015b) The liquidity premium is the market implied yield difference in on-the-run and off-the-run Treasuries. It is constructed by bootstrapping two yield curves, one of off-the-run Treasuries (in the manner of Gurkaynak, Sack, Wright (2006)) and one of on-the-run Treasuries (from U.S. Treasury data) and taking their difference at the ten year point. Since these two securities differ only in their liquidity this difference represents the additional yield charged by market participants for holding the less liquid off-the-run securities. We then normalize this spread by the prevailing on-the-run yield to assess how much of the creditriskless yield on-the-run bondholders give up for superior liquidity. Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14 YoY M4 Growth (broad money measure including instutional safe assets)
YoY M2 Growth (narrower money measure)
Source: Author's analysis, Center for Financial Stability (2015) , and the Board of Governors (2015a) Monthly growth rates (year-over-year) of a narrow monetary aggregate M2 (Board of Governors) and broader aggregate Divisia M4 (Center for Financial Stability) which includes commercial paper, U.S. Treasuries, and other assets used in money-like ways. The growth rate of the broader Divisia M4 fell faster and more severely than M2, contracting for over a year. Source: Authors' analysis This value of θ for each value of n that best matches the empirical estimates of the liquidity premium and trading volume.
